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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The sole issue we must resolve in this appeal is whether 
TWA was insolvent on November 4, 1991 so that the 
transfer of certain monies to a judgment creditor within 90 
days of TWA's petition for bankruptcy constituted a 
preference. Our analysis of TWA's insolvency depends on 
how TWA's assets and liabilities should be valued. 
 
We conclude that TWA's assets must be valued at fair 
market value in the context of a "going concern" and that 
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its liabilities should be measured at face value. Inasmuch 
as we agree with the bankruptcy court's calculations, albeit 
with minor qualifications, we hold that on the date in 
question, TWA was insolvent. Accordingly, any transfer of 
TWA's monies to Travellers falls within the preference 
statute, 11 U.S.C. S 547(b). 
 
We will reverse the district court's order, which had 
reversed the insolvency holding of the bankruptcy court, 
and direct the district court to remand this case to the 
bankruptcy court for proceedings consistent with our 
opinion. 
 
I. 
 
On October 12, 1991, the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York entered a judgment in 
the amount of $12.3 million in favor of Travellers 
International AG ("Travellers") against Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. ("TWA"). On November 4, 1991, TWA obtained a stay of 
enforcement of the judgment by depositing $13.7 million in 
cash with the clerk of the court. Eighty-eight days after the 
deposit was made, on January 31, 1992, TWA filed a 
petition for reorganization in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District of Delaware under Chapter 11 (11 
U.S.C. S 101 et seq.). Subsequently, TWA filed a complaint 
against Travellers in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the District of Delaware, seeking a declaration that the 
$13.7 million deposit was a preferential transfer which was 
voidable under 11 U.S.C. S 547(b).1  See Travellers Int'l AG v. 
Robinson, 982 F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1992). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 11 U.S.C. S 547(b) (1993) states: 
 
       Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee 
may 
       avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-- 
 
        (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
 
        (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor 
       before such transfer was made; 
 
        (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
 
        (4) made-- 
 
                                3 
  
A. The Bankruptcy Court Proceedings  
 
The bankruptcy court held a four day bench trial in 
February 1994 to determine whether the deposit was 
indeed a preferential transfer. See In Re Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 180 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994). In 
particular, the court focused its attention on the statutory 
requirement that TWA was insolvent on the day of the 
transfer. See 11 U.S.C. S 547(b)(3). Following the code's 
guidance that a corporation is insolvent when "the sum of 
such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's 
property, at a fair valuation," 11 U.S.C. S 101(32)(A),2 the 
bankruptcy court heard evidence by experts hired by both 
TWA and Travellers on the value of TWA's assets and 
liabilities. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
         (A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the 
       petition; 
       or 
         (B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the 
       filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such 
       transfer was an insider; and 
 
        (5) that enables such creditor to receive more th an such creditor 
       would receive if-- 
 
         (A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; 
         (B) the transfer had not been made; and 
         (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent 
         provided by the provisions of this title. 
 
2. 11 U.S.C. S 101(32)(A) (1993) states in full: 
 
       "insolvent" means-- 
 
        (A) with reference to an entity other than a part nership and a 
       municipality, financial condition such that the sum of such 
       entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a 
fair 
       valuation, exclusive of-- 
 
        (i) property transferred, concealed, or removed w ith intent to 
       hinder, delay, or defraud such entity's creditors; and 
 
        (ii) property that may be exempted from property of the estate 
       under section 522 of this title[.] 
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1. Travellers' Arguments 
 
Travellers, together with its expert Global Aviation 
Associates, Ltd. ("Global"), offered testimony that TWA's 
assets exceeded its liabilities by almost two billion dollars, 
and thus that the company was solvent. Global based its 
"fair valuation" of TWA's assets on their market value 
assuming that TWA was not compelled to sell the assets 
under any time constraint. Applying this methodology, 
Global valued TWA's operating assets at $4,162,273,000. 
See 180 B.R. at 421. Combining this with the cash, cash 
equivalents, accounts receivable, and other investments 
owned by the company, Travellers argued that the value of 
the company's assets totaled $5,298,373,000. 
 
Turning to TWA's liabilities, Travellers contended that 
S 101(32)(A) called for a "fair valuation" of TWA's liabilities, 
which Travellers insisted translated into a fair market 
valuation of TWA's publicly traded debt. As a result, 
Travellers' expert testified that TWA's debt obligations 
amounted to $662,898,000.3 With respect to TWA's 
additional liabilities, Travellers' expert testified that the 
value of TWA's aircraft lease obligations was $813,604,000; 
pension plan liabilities, $219 million; taxes, $949.7 million; 
and other liabilities, $947.4 million. Travellers calculated 
the sum of TWA's liabilities to be $3,593,000,000. 
 
Inasmuch as TWA's assets, if valued at $5,298,373,000 
exceeded its liabilities at $3,593,000,000, Travellers urged 
the bankruptcy court to find that TWA was solvent. 
 
2. TWA's Arguments 
 
TWA and its experts, Avmark Inc. ("Avmark"), offered very 
different valuations of both assets and liabilities. According 
to TWA's calculations, TWA was insolvent on November 4, 
1991, the date of the transfer to the escrow account, 
because TWA's liabilities exceeded assets by as much as 
three billion dollars. Avmark based its "fair valuation" of 
TWA's assets on the amount realizable from the assets 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This figure is far less than the "face" value of TWA's public debts, 
$1,776,752,000, which we assume represented the net present value of 
TWA's debts as of the date of the transfer. 
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following a hypothetical sale of the assets within a 
reasonable time period. Referring to 12-18 months as a 
reasonable time period, Avmark concluded that the overall 
value of TWA's assets was $2,561,366,000. See 180 B.R. at 
404. 
 
As to the company's liabilities, TWA contended that the 
fair valuation prescription in 11 U.S.C. S 101(32)(A) did not 
apply to liabilities. TWA thus asked the court to consider 
the face value of the company's debt, rather than the much 
lower market value urged by Travellers, in determining the 
company's insolvency. TWA's calculation of the company's 
liabilities also included an extra $634,814,000 of what it 
termed contingent liabilities, as well as up to $576,000,000 
of pension plan liabilities. These additional liabilities 
represented costs to which TWA would be subject if it had 
ceased operating soon after November 4, 1991: they 
included $138.8 million payable to two of TWA's unions, 
$214.8 million for severance payments pursuant to 
contractual obligations, and $248.2 million in wind down 
expenses. TWA urged the court to consider these liabilities 
in light of the high likelihood as of November 4, 1991 that 
TWA would soon cease operations. Combined with $370 
million in tax liability, medical/dental benefits totaling 
$400 million, and almost one billion dollars of other 
liabilities, the liability figure urged by TWA totaled between 
five and five and a half billion dollars. 
 
Because this figure exceeded the asset valuation of 
$2,561,366,000, TWA urged that the company was 
insolvent. 
 
3. The Bankruptcy Court's Rulings 
 
In an extensive opinion, the bankruptcy court agreed 
with TWA's conclusion that the company was insolvent. 
Addressing the valuation of assets, the court agreed with 
TWA that a "fair valuation" of assets would be found by 
calculating the amount that would be realized by converting 
non-cash assets into cash over a reasonable time frame. 
See 180 B.R. at 411. The court found Travellers' position 
that asset valuations exist independently of an actually 
realizable amount to be unrealistic. As such, the court 
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largely adopted Avmark's asset valuations. Altogether, the 
bankruptcy court disagreed with TWA's asset valuations in 
only three relatively minor categories: the company's 
investment in affiliates, the value of the company's gates 
outside of St. Louis and JFK, and the measure of the 
company's accounts and other receivables. In these three 
areas, the court found that for various factual reasons, 
TWA's figures were too low, and substituted Travellers' 
figures. The court concluded that the proper valuation of 
TWA's assets was $3,125,811,000. 
 
Turning to the company's liabilities, the bankruptcy court 
first considered whether TWA's public debt should be 
measured at market value or at face value. The court 
concluded that face value was the proper guide for two 
reasons. First, the text of 11 U.S.C. S 101(32)(A) suggested 
that the "fair valuation" requirement did not apply to debts. 
Second, the court opined that valuing debts at market 
value would, among other things, create an unprincipled 
distinction between the treatment of private and public 
debt. See 180 B.R. at 423-24. The court thus adopted the 
face value figure of the company's debts urged by TWA, 
$1,776,752,000. 
 
As to the liabilities incurred by the company's aircraft 
leases, the court accepted TWA's figure of $595 million 
because it appeared to be the only probative evidence put 
forward by the two parties. TWA's view that the medical 
and dental benefits obligations amounted to $400 million 
was also accepted. Travellers had argued that this liability 
should be zero because TWA's benefits program had created 
an offsetting good will asset among its employees. This 
argument was rejected on the ground that the good will was 
not a saleable asset and had no market value. Having 
largely accepted TWA's asset figures, the bankruptcy court 
in turn adopted TWA's estimate of its tax liability, $370 
million, and also adopted Travellers' largely uncontested 
figure for `other' liabilities, $947,381,000. 
 
The final liabilities to be determined were TWA's pension 
plan obligations and what TWA termed `contingent' 
liabilities. The court adopted TWA's view that these 
liabilities were to be assessed in light of the likelihood that 
TWA was on the verge of going out of business on 
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November 4, 1991. As a result, the court calculated the 
liabilities that TWA would incur if the company ceased its 
operations. This added $634,814,000 of contingent 
liabilities arising from the hypothetical liquidation to the 
overall liability figure, and also raised the pension plan 
liability from $219.4 million to $401 million. Altogether, the 
bankruptcy court decided that TWA's liabilities totaled 
$5,124,947,000, which exceeded the asset figure of 
$3,125,811,000 by two billion dollars. Thus, the 
bankruptcy court held that TWA was insolvent, and that 
the transfer of $13.7 million was voidable as a preference. 
 
B. The District Court Proceedings  
 
On appeal, the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded to the bankruptcy court. See Travellers Int'l AG 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.), 
203 B.R. 890 (D. Del. 1996). The district court agreed with 
the bankruptcy court's position that the proper legal test 
for a fair valuation of the company's assets should be based 
on the amount that could be obtained if the assets were 
sold in a reasonable time. See id. at 895. Concluding that 
the bankruptcy court's adoption of a 12 to 18 month period 
as a reasonable time frame was a factual matter, and that 
none of the bankruptcy court's factual determinations 
relating to assets was clearly erroneous, the court affirmed 
the bankruptcy court's determination that the company's 
liabilities were $3,125,811,000. 
 
On the liability side, however, the district court disagreed 
with the bankruptcy court's legal conclusion that the "fair 
valuation" requirement of 11 U.S.C. S 101(32)(A) did not 
apply to the company's debts. Relying largely on Mellon 
Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 
648 (3d Cir. 1991), the district court held that both assets 
and liabilities were subject to the fair valuation 
requirement. Accordingly, the court concluded that the 
bankruptcy court's decision to value the public debt at face 
value was error. See 203 B.R. at 897-98. In all other 
respects, the court agreed with the bankruptcy court's legal 
analysis, and found that the bankruptcy court's factual 
conclusions were not clearly erroneous. Thus, the district 
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court reversed the portion of the bankruptcy court's 
decision relating to liabilities, and remanded with 
instructions to conduct a fair valuation of TWA's liabilities. 
 
The instant appeal and cross-appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
We exercise jurisdiction to review this appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. SS 1291 and 158(d). See Porter v. Mid-Penn 
Consumer Discount Co. (In re Porter), 961 F.2d 1066, 1072 
(3d Cir. 1992). Whether a company is insolvent under the 
Bankruptcy Code is considered a mixed question of law and 
fact. See Moody v. Security Pacific Business Credit, 971 
F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir. 1992). While factual findings are 
reviewed only for clear error, our review of "the trial court's 
choice and interpretation of legal precepts and its 
application of those precepts to the historical facts" is 
plenary. Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 
F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
III. 
 
A. Asset Valuations 
 
The first question we must answer is how to measure 
properly a "fair valuation" of TWA's assets according to 11 
U.S.C. S 101(32)(A). Because liquidation in bankruptcy was 
not clearly imminent on the date of the challenged transfer, 
we concern ourselves with how to achieve a fair valuation 
of TWA's assets on a "going concern" basis. See Moody, 971 
F.2d at 1067. 
 
In the century that has passed since the enactment of 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the courts have offered various 
statements describing how to achieve a fair valuation of 
assets for a going concern. The cases generally direct us to 
look at "market value" rather than "distress value," but 
then also caution that the valuation must be analyzed "in 
a realistic framework" considering amounts that can be 
realized "in a reasonable time" assuming a "willing seller" 
and a "willing buyer." See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust 
Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1761 (1994); 
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Syracuse Engineering Co. v. Haight, 110 F.2d 468, 471-72 
(2d Cir. 1940). Although these statements are helpful in 
many cases, they fail to resolve squarely the question of law 
that is before us. That question centers around a 
disagreement about the appropriate time frame under 
which a hypothetical sale of assets must take place to 
achieve a valuation that is "fair" for a going concern. 
 
Logic and common sense inform us that the amount that 
can be realized from the sale of an asset varies as a 
function of the time period over which the asset must be 
sold. If a company must sell its assets in a short time 
period, it may be forced to accept a relatively low price; if 
it can sell the assets over a longer period, it will be able to 
hold out for the possibility of a higher price. TWA's position, 
accepted by both the bankruptcy court and the district 
court, is that a "fair valuation" is best achieved by a 
hypothetical sale over 12-18 months (TWA's definition of a 
"reasonable" time period). That is, the value of the assets is 
to be measured by the sales price that could be attained if 
there were a period of 12-18 months to sell off the assets. 
Travellers, however, argues that the proper time period is 
substantially longer: so long, in fact, that the assets should 
be valued without regard to the pressures of time. In other 
words, Travellers maintains that the value of the assets is 
to be measured by the price that could be attained if TWA 
could hold out for as long a period as necessary to receive 
a `full' price on its assets. 
 
The parties enlist a substantial body of case law in 
support of their respective positions. TWA bases its position 
on a voluminous line of cases stating that fair valuation 
involves a value that can be made available for payments of 
debts within a reasonable period of time. See, e.g., Syracuse 
Engineering Co., 110 F.2d at 471; Briden v. Foley, 776 F.2d 
379, 382 (1st Cir. 1985); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Bone, 333 F.2d 984, 987 (8th Cir. 1964). TWA argues 
that 12-18 months is a reasonable period of time, such that 
the use of a 12-18 month sale scenario by the bankruptcy 
court was proper. 
 
Travellers, on the other hand, relies on cases stating that 
fair valuation of a going concern implicates a fair market 
valuation. See Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin 
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Indus.), 78 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 1996); Briden, 776 F.2d at 
382. Travellers then argues that a fair market valuation is 
achieved by a sale without regard to the pressures of time. 
See BFP, 511 U.S. at 537-38, 114 S. Ct. at 1761-62; 
Duncan v. Landis, 106 F. 839, 858-59 (3d Cir. 1901). 
Accordingly, Travellers construes the 12-18 month sale 
scenario used by the bankruptcy court and district court as 
a forced sale, which undervalued TWA's assets and led to 
an improper conclusion that TWA was insolvent on the date 
of the transfer. 
 
We begin our analysis by recognizing the overwhelming 
body of authority that makes clear that a fair valuation of 
assets contemplates a conversion of assets into cash during 
a reasonable period of time. See, e.g., In re Roblin Indus., 78 
F.3d at 35-36; Moody, 971 F.2d at 1068; Briden, 776 F.2d 
at 382; American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 333 F.2d at 987; 
Syracuse Engineering Co., 110 F.2d at 471; 2 Collier on 
Bankruptcy P 101.32[4] at 101-116 (15th ed. Rev. 1997).4 
The question then becomes how to construe whether a 
given time period is reasonable. As previously indicated, 
TWA maintains that a reasonable time is the period of time 
that a company such as TWA might reasonably require to 
sell off its assets in order to pay off its debts and attempt 
to satisfy its creditors. Travellers disagrees with TWA's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This interpretation of the fair valuation requirement followed 
naturally 
from the text of the insolvency definition in effect from 1898 until 1978. 
During that period, the Act stated that a "person shall be deemed 
insolvent . . . whenever the aggregate of his property . . . shall not at 
fair 
valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts." 11 U.S.C. S 1(19) 
(repealed 1978). This text suggests a conversion-to-cash valuation. 
 
In contrast, the current version states only that insolvency is a 
"financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater 
than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation." 11 U.S.C. 
S 101(32)(A) (1993). Although the conversion-to-cash methodology is less 
obvious from the current text, courts have uniformly treated the current 
version of the statute as being identical in relevant part to the earlier 
version, and we will do the same. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, 85th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5811 ("The 
definition of `insolvent' in paragraph [(32)] is adopted from section 
1(19) 
of current law. . . . It is the traditional bankruptcy balance sheet test 
of 
insolvency."). 
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approach, and asserts that a reasonable period is the time 
that an active company might reasonably take to sell its 
assets in the typical course of business at the highest 
available price. 
 
We believe that the proper point of reference for 
determining a "reasonable" time period in the case of 
S 101(32)(A) should begin with the financial interests of the 
creditors. See Syracuse Engineering Co., 110 F.2d at 471. 
The reasonable time should be an estimate of the time that 
a typical creditor would find optimal: not so short a period 
that the value of the goods is substantially impaired via a 
forced sale, but not so long a time that a typical creditor 
would receive less satisfaction of its claim, as a result of the 
time value of money and typical business needs, by waiting 
for the possibility of a higher price. Cf. id. This test satisfies 
the requirement of a fair valuation because it identifies, 
as best it can, the equilibrium point between the two 
competing concerns of creditors: the desire to maximize the 
dollar figure from the assets to be sold, and the desire to 
have the assets sold off quickly to satisfy creditors' claims 
sooner rather than later. The competing view that fair 
valuation contemplates a hypothetical sale without regard 
to the pressures of time fails in light of contrary authority. 
See Briden, 776 F.2d at 382 ("Asset valuation. . . should 
be reduced by the value of the assets not readily 
susceptible to liquidation and the payment of debts"); Stern 
v. Paper, 183 F. 228, 230-31 (D.N.D. 1910) ("[F]air 
valuation . . . means a value that can be made promptly 
effective by the owner of property to pay his debts.") 
(quotations omitted). 
 
Contrary to the assertions of Travellers, Duncan v. 
Landis, 106 F. 839 (3d Cir. 1901), does not support 
Travellers' position that the hypothetical sale must take 
place absent time pressures. In Landis, this court evaluated 
a set of jury instructions concerning how to achieve a fair 
valuation of a debtor's assets. The district court had 
instructed the jury using the traditional equity test for 
insolvency, that a debtor was solvent only if the debtor was 
able to meet all obligations when they became due. This 
court reversed, holding that a fair valuation of assets was 
not achieved when a debtor was forced to sell assets "at 
once" on the date the debt matured. Id. at 859. 
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We disagree with Travellers' view that Landis holds that 
a fair valuation implicates a hypothetical sale absent time 
pressures. As we read Landis, it presages the view we have 
espoused: that fair valuation does not preclude a 
continuing business from valuing its assets in 
contemplation of a reasonable time for their liquidation. 
Thus, whereas the district court in Landis required 
insolvency to be measured by the value of those assets 
available at the time the debt became due, the court of 
appeals found that formula to be in error. As our court 
instructed then, the application of such a formula to 
measure the value of the debtor's assets would permit 
creditors "to take advantage of the necessities and 
embarrassments of the [debtor] in order to procure" the 
assets at a price less than their fair value. Id. at 858. 
 
We are satisfied that the bankruptcy court applied the 
appropriate legal standard in determining the fair valuation 
of TWA's assets. See In re Trans World Airlines, 180 B.R. at 
412, 412 n.30. In light of the size and nature of Trans 
World Airlines, the bankruptcy court's determination that 
12 to 18 months was a "reasonable time" to value TWA's 
assets is not clearly erroneous. Such a span of time reflects 
the period in which a diligent administrator, concerned 
with the interests of TWA's creditors, could inventory, 
prepare, and sell TWA's considerable assets in a reasonable 
fashion. Further, we agree with the district court that none 
of the remaining factual findings by the bankruptcy court 
relating to assets were clearly erroneous. Consistent with 
the district court's holding that affirmed the bankruptcy 
court's asset valuation, we hold that TWA's assets as of 
November 4, 1991 were worth $3,125,811,000. 
 
B. Liability Valuations 
 
Next we must decide how to value TWA's liabilities under 
11 U.S.C. S 101(32)(A). To decide this issue we must 
address the extent to which the valuation of liabilities 
under the Bankruptcy Code should be based upon actual 
market conditions faced by the debtor. In particular, we 
must resolve two legal questions: first, whether TWA's 
publicly traded debt should be measured at face value or 
market value, and second, whether liquidation costs should 
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be included as contingent liabilities. Then, we must review 
one factual question: whether the bankruptcy court was 
correct in finding that TWA's debt was not reduced by one 
billion dollars under an agreement between TWA and its 
creditors. 
 
1. 
 
The first question is whether TWA's publicly traded debt 
should be measured at its face value of $1,776,752,000, or 
its market value of $662,898,000. Both TWA and Travellers 
assume, as did the bankruptcy court and district court, 
that the question of whether to use face value or market 
value hinges upon a question of statutory interpretation. 11 
U.S.C. S 101(32)(A) states that insolvency is the "financial 
condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is 
greater than all of such entity's property, at a fair 
valuation." The parties indicate that if we agree with the 
district court that "fair valuation" in S 101(32)(A) modifies 
both "property" and "debts," then we should adopt the 
market value figure for TWA's debt. If, on the other hand, 
we agree with the bankruptcy court that "fair valuation" as 
found in the statute modifies only "property," then our 
insolvency calculations should utilize the face value of 
TWA's publicly traded obligations. 
 
Travellers argues that S 101(32)(A) demands a market 
valuation because the phrase "fair valuation" in S 101(32)(A) 
modifies both "property" and "debts," such that the fair 
market valuation used for assets should apply equally to 
liabilities. For support, Travellers points to statements 
made by this court and others suggesting that the fair 
valuation requirement of S 101(32)(A) applies to TWA's 
debts. See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, 
Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 648 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The debtor's assets 
and liabilities are tallied at fair valuation to determine 
whether the corporation's debts exceed its assets."); Briden, 
776 F.2d at 382 (noting that the insolvency definition 
"focuses on the fair market value of the debtor's assets and 
liabilities"). 
 
However, TWA maintains that the appropriate valuation 
of TWA's public debt is its face value rather than its market 
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value because the requirement of a "fair valuation" in 
S 101(32)(A) does not apply to debts and should not be 
construed to do so. For support, TWA points to the text of 
the insolvency definition that was in effect until 1978.5 
According to TWA, the pre-1978 statute makes clear that 
the fair valuation requirement applies to properties but not 
to debts. Second, TWA points to the insolvency definition 
that applies to partnerships, codified at 11 U.S.C. 
S 101(32)(B).6 Because this definition applies the fair 
valuation standard only to property (assets), and there is no 
reason to think that partnerships and corporations should 
be treated differently in this respect, TWA argues that its 
debt is not subject to a fair valuation requirement. 
Accordingly, TWA argues that its debt should be considered 
at its face value. 
 
We agree with TWA that we must consider the face value 
of TWA's publicly traded debt rather than the market value. 
This follows from our determination that we must treat 
TWA as a "going concern." See Moody, 971 F.2d at 1067. 
Because we treat TWA as a going concern, we cannot 
consider the market's devaluation of TWA's debt resulting 
from the possibility as of the date of the transfer that TWA 
would cease operations and be unable to satisfy its 
promises. It is this devaluation that creates the difference 
between the face value figure urged by TWA and the market 
value figure Travellers would have us adopt: the former 
represents the net present value of TWA's obligations, while 
the latter represents the net present value of TWA's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See note 4, supra. 
 
6. 11 U.S.C. S 101(32)(B) (1993) states that "insolvent" means: 
 
        (B) with reference to a partnership, financial condition such that 
       the sum of such partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate 
of, 
       at a fair valuation-- 
 
        (i) all of such partnership's property, exclusive of property of 
the 
       kind specified in subparagraph (A)(i) of this paragraph; and 
 
        (ii) the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's 
       nonpartnership property, exclusive of property of the kind 
specified 
       in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, over such partner's 
       nonpartnership debts[.] 
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obligations but discounted by the likelihood that TWA will 
be unable to pay its debts in full. 
 
Thus, even accepting the dictum in Metro 
Communications stating that we must fairly value liabilities, 
see 945 F.2d at 648, in this context we do not interpret the 
term "fair valuation" to mean fair market valuation. 
Because our going concern methodology precludes us from 
devaluing TWA's debt based on creditors' perceptions of 
TWA's viability, a fair valuation of TWA's public debt is the 
face value of that debt. See Covey v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 
960 F.2d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that valuation of 
debt must be made from the perspective of the debtor, 
rather than the perspective of a third party creditor).7 
Accordingly, we hold that the proper figure for TWA's 
publicly traded debt is the debt's face value of 
$1,776,752,000. 
 
2. 
 
We proceed to consider whether the bankruptcy court 
erred in including amongst TWA's liabilities various costs 
that TWA would incur if TWA were to cease operations 
within 12-18 months of the date of the transfer. The 
bankruptcy court deemed it proper to consider the costs 
that TWA would suffer if it were to cease operations 
because courts must consider "contingent liabilities" in 
their calculations of liability in an amount discounted by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. As the bankruptcy court noted, anomalous results would occur if we 
allowed liabilities to be valued based on the debtor's financial position: 
 
       If holders of claims are fully informed of the debtor's affairs and 
the 
       asset values are less than the face amount of the claims, they 
would 
       never value their claims at more than the value of the assets. 
       Likewise, the fully informed debtor would never be willing to pay 
       claimants more than claimants would be willing to take. Thus, the 
       value of the claims would never exceed the value of the assets and 
       insolvency could never occur. 
 
180 B.R. at 424. See also Covey, 960 F.2d at 660 ("The beneficiary of a 
guarantee never values that obligation at more than the issuer's gross 
assets, and if other claims (say, secured debts) stand ahead of this one, 
the beneficiary does not value the guarantee at more than the issuer's 
net assets."). 
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the probability that the contingency will occur. See In re 
Trans World Airlines, 180 B.R. at 426-27. The bankruptcy 
court reasoned that under the 12-18 month sale scenario it 
used to value TWA's assets, the liabilities contingent upon 
TWA's projected dissolution would become fixed. The 
bankruptcy court was also influenced by the probability as 
of the date of the transfer that TWA would soon be forced 
to cease operations. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court held 
that it was proper to include the full costs of TWA's 
dissolution as liabilities, even though TWA was not 
liquidating on November 4, 1991. These liabilities totaled 
$816.4 million, and consisted of $248.2 million in wind 
down expenses, $214.8 million for severance payments, 
$181.6 million in additional pension plan liabilities, $138.8 
million payable to TWA's unions, and $33.1 million of 
COBRA obligations.8 
 
We agree with the bankruptcy court that it is proper to 
consider contingent liabilities when evaluating the 
insolvency of a corporation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
S 101(32)(A). See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Official Comm. of 
Unsecured Creditors (In re R.M.L., Inc.), 92 F.3d 139, 156 
(3d Cir. 1996); In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 
198, 200 (7th Cir. 1988); Syracuse Engineering Co. v. 
Haight, 97 F.2d 573, 576 (2d Cir. 1938) (L. Hand, J.). 
However, we cannot agree that costs associated with the 
dissolution of the debtor can be included under that rubric. 
Indeed, it is the antithesis of a "going concern" valuation to 
include such costs. See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy P 101.32[4] 
at 101-116 (15th ed. Rev. 1997) ("There is overwhelming 
authority to the effect that . . . subsequent dismemberment 
. . . should not enter into the picture.") (citing cases). 
Rather, contingent liabilities must be limited to costs 
arising from foreseeable events that might occur while the 
debtor remains a going concern. See FDIC v. Bell, 106 F.3d 
258, 264 (8th Cir. 1997). Because we treat TWA as a going 
concern, we will not include in the insolvency calculation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. COBRA obligations require employers to provide certain employees 
with continued health care coverage following job loss. See Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 1161-1168 (West Supp. 
1997). 
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the $816.4 million in liabilities associated with TWA's 
dissolution that was included by the bankruptcy court. 
 
3. 
 
The final issue we address is whether the bankruptcy 
court's factual finding that TWA had not reached an 
agreement with its creditors to reduce its public debt by $1 
billion was clearly erroneous. Travellers maintains that 
prior to November 4, 1991, TWA had entered into a pre- 
petition agreement with its public debt holders in which the 
creditors had agreed to reduce TWA's debt burden by $1 
billion in exchange for certain concessions from TWA. 
Travellers points primarily to press releases and SEC filings 
authored by TWA, which indicate that TWA was attempting 
to restructure its debts in anticipation of reorganization 
under Chapter 11. 
 
The bankruptcy court found that these efforts had not 
yet come to fruition as of the date of the transfer, such that 
the value of TWA's public debt could not be reduced by the 
$1 billion proposed in the debt restructuring plan. 
According to Travellers, the bankruptcy court clearly erred 
in concluding that TWA and its creditors had not reached 
a binding agreement, which would have reduced the face 
value of TWA's debt (and thus TWA's liability) by $1 billion. 
 
On review of the record, we hold that the bankruptcy 
court's finding was not clearly erroneous. Although the 
record is clear that TWA and its creditors had entered into 
negotiations, there is little support for the view that the 
agreement had been finalized as of November 4, 1991. All 
of the documents relied upon by Travellers that are dated 
prior to November 4, 1991 are either marked as drafts, or 
else indicate that the terms of the proposed agreement had 
not been finalized. Further, only certain elements of the 
alleged agreement were finalized in the plan that was 
ultimately approved on August 11, 1993. Accordingly, we 
cannot conclude that the bankruptcy court's finding that 
no agreement existed as of the date of the transfer was 
clearly erroneous. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 
F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he appellate court must 
accept the factual determination of the fact finder unless 
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that determination either (1) is completely devoid of 
minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the 
supportive evidentiary data.") (quotations omitted). 
 
IV. 
 
The holding of the bankruptcy court in this case was that 
TWA was insolvent on November 4, 1991 because the value 
of TWA's liabilities exceeded that of its assets. According 
to the bankruptcy court, TWA's liabilities totaled 
$5,124,947,000, which exceeded its asset valuation of 
$3,125,811,000 by two billion dollars. On review of the 
legal and factual issues in this case, we have concluded 
that the bankruptcy court's calculations were correct except 
insofar as the bankruptcy court included $816.4 million in 
liabilities associated with TWA's dissolution. Subtracting 
this sum from the bankruptcy court's liability figure, we 
conclude that the proper valuation of TWA's liabilities on 
the date of the transfer was $4,308,547,000. Because this 
figure still exceeds the $3,125,811,000 valuation of TWA's 
assets, we conclude that the bankruptcy court was correct 
in holding that TWA was insolvent as of November 4, 1991, 
and that the deposit of $13.7 million on that date to stay 
the enforcement of the judgment against TWA in favor of 
Travellers was a voidable preferential transfer pursuant to 
11 U.S.C. S 547(b). 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's order 
dated December 30, 1996, which had reversed the 
insolvency holding of the bankruptcy court, and we will 
direct the district court to remand this case to the 
bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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